The law is clear that a consent order can only be set aside
on grounds that would vitiate a contract: e.g. common mistake, fraud,
collusion, misrepresentation, duress and illegality. There is also the possibility
of a “slip” in drawing up the order or
an error in expressing the manifest intention of the
parties.
See: Gray v. R., 2004 CanLII 47133 (NB CA),
<http://canlii.ca/t/1jg0x>
[13]
Accepting that the impugned consent order was
entered into with the apparent authority of the
applicant’s former solicitor, the law is clear that a consent order can only be
set aside on grounds that would vitiate a contract: e.g. common mistake, fraud,
collusion, misrepresentation, duress and illegality. See Morencyand
Pelletier v. Charest et al. reflex, (1991), 123 N.B.R. (2d)
392 (C.A.) and Chitel v. Rothbart, [1987] O.J. No. 2321 (Ont. S.C.)(QL),
Racz v. Mission (Dist.) 1988 CanLII 2937 (BC CA), (1988), 22 B.C.L.R. (2d) 70 (C.A.) and Wagg
v. Canada, 2003 FCA 303 (CanLII), [2004] 1 F.C.R. 206 (C.A.). There is also the
possiblity of a “slip” in drawing up the order or an error in expressing the manifest intention of the parties: see Beanland v. Beanland 1997 CanLII 14616 (NL CA), (1997), 151 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 51
(Nfld.S.C.(A.D.)) at para. 41 and Paper Machinery Ltd. et al. v. J.O.
Ross Engineering Corp. et al., 1934 CanLII 1 (SCC), [1934] S.C.R. 186.
No comments:
Post a Comment